

VITA

Kenneth George Binmore

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University College London
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Birth : September 27, 1940 in London, England. British nationality.

Marital Status: Married, four children.

Education:

Imperial College, University of London:
B.Sc. (Mathematics), June, 1962 (First Class Honours: Governors' Prize)
Ph.D. (Mathematical Analysis)

Fellowships and Awards

State Scholarship, 1959–1962
Postgraduate Studentship, 1962–1965
New York State Fellowship, 1968
Suntory-Toyota Research Grant, 1984–1986
National Science Foundation Grant, 1986
Suntory-Toyota Research Grant, 1986
ESRC Research Grant, 1986–88
National Science Foundation Grants, 1989–1993
ESRC Research Grant, 1994–1995
Fellow of the British Academy, 1995–
ESRC Research Centre, 1995–2002
Leverhulme Trust Personal Research Chair, 1995–2000

Academy of Social Science, 1999–2005
Commander of the British Empire, 2001–
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2002–
Honorary Research Fellow in Philosophy at Bristol University, 2007–
Honorary Fellow of London School of Economics, 2007–

Employment

Lecturer at Royal Holloway College, University of London, 1965–1969
Lecturer, Reader and Professor of Mathematics at L.S.E., 1969–1988
Professor of Economics at L.S.E., 1988–1990
Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, 1988–1993.
Professor of Economics at University College London, 1991–2002
Emeritus Professor of Economics at London University, 2002–

Visiting Appointments

Visiting Professor of Mathematics at the S.U.N.Y. at Albany, 1967–1968.
Visiting Lecturer in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, 1985–1986.
John T. Easley Visiting Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University, 1998.
Visiting Professor of Economics at Bristol University, 2001–
Visiting Fellow at the Advanced Institute in Princeton, 2001.
Gordon Moore Scholar, California Institute of Technology, 2002–2003
Mellon Professor of the Humanities, California Institute of Technology, 2004
Mellon Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology, 2005
Visiting Professor of Philosophy at LSE, 2007–

Other Positions

Chairman of Economic Theory Workshop at Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics (STICERD), 1977–1987.
Chairman of Department of Statistical and Mathematical Sciences at LSE, 1978–1980.
Fellow Commoner of Churchill College, Cambridge University, 1980–.
Fellow of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications, 1980–.

Editorial Board of *Economica*, 1980–1988.
Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1988–.
Athletic Coach, ΑΞΔ Sorority, University of Michigan, 1990.
Associate Editor *Games and Economic Behavior*, 1990–.
Director of Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE), 1994–2002
Associate Editor *International Journal of Game Theory*, 1994–1996.
Editor of MIT Press series on *Economic Learning and Social Evolution*, 1995–2006.
Associate Editor *Economics and Philosophy*, 1995–1997.
Fellow of the British Academy, 1995–
Research Associate at the Centre for the Philosophy of the Social and Physical Sciences at LSE, 1996–.
Council of the Royal Economic Society, 1997–2002.
Fellow of the Royal Society for Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, 1997–.
Council of the European Economic Association 1998–2003.
Commander of the British Empire 2002–.
Council of the Econometric Society, 2003–
Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003–.
Councillor-at-Large, Econometric Society, 2005–6
Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, 2007–

Research Interests

Game Theory, Bargaining, Rational Choice, Experimental Economics, Evolutionary Psychology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Mathematical Analysis.

Publications

“A trigonometric inequality,” *Journal of London Mathematical Society*, 41 (1966), 693-696.

“Some limitation theorems for (A, λ) summability,” *Mathematische Zeitschrift*, 98 (1967), 227–234.

“Coefficient estimates for lacunary power series and Dirichlet series, I,” *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society* (3), 18 (1968), 36–48 (with J. M. Anderson).

“Coefficient estimates for lacunary power series and Dirichlet series, II,” *Proceedings*

- of the London Mathematical Society (3)*, 18 (1968), 49–68 (with J. M. Anderson).
- “A note on the strong law of large numbers,” *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, 74 (1968), 49–68 (with M. Katz).
- “On the coefficients of typically real functions,” *Duke Mathematical Journal*, 36 (1969), 455–464 (with W. Kirwan)
- “A note on characteristic functions,” *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 40 (1969), 303–307 (with H. Stratton).
- “Analytic functions with Hadamard gaps,” *Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society*, 1 (1969), 211–217.
- “A density theorem with an application to gap power series,” *Transactions of the American Mathematical Society*, 148 (1970), 367–384.
- “On entire functions with gap power series,” *Glasgow Mathematical Journal*, 12 (1971), 89–97 (with J. M. Anderson).
- “Closure theorems with applications to entire functions with gaps,” *Transactions of the American Mathematical Society*, 161 (1971), 381–400 (with J. M. Anderson).
- “On Türan’s Lemma,” *Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society*, 3 (1971), 313–317.
- “Interpolation, approximation and gap series,” *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (3)*, 25 (1972), 751–768.
- “Boundary behaviour of functions with Hadamard gaps,” *Nagoya Mathematics Journal*, 48 (1972), 173–181.
- “The coefficients of exponential series,” *Journal of the London Mathematical Society (2)*, 10 (1975), 19–24.
- “An example in group preference,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 10 (1975), 377–385.
- “Social choice and parties,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 13 (1976), 459–464.

Mathematical Analysis: A Straightforward Approach, Cambridge University Press, London (1977).

“Mathematics, games and society,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications*, 13 (1977), 263–271.

“Zero–sum games,” *Learn Magazine*, 5 (1979).

Foundations of Analysis: Logic, Sets and Numbers, Cambridge University Press, London (1980).

“Nash bargaining theory I, II and III,” *ICERD* discussion papers 80/09 80/14 and 80/15 (1980) published in *Economics of Bargaining*, eds. K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).

Foundations of Analysis: Topological Ideas, Cambridge University Press, London (1981).

“Nash bargaining and incomplete information,” Cambridge Economic Theory discussion paper 82/58 (1980) published in *Economics of Bargaining*, eds. K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).

“Perfect equilibria in bargaining models,” *ICERD* discussion papers 82/58 (1982) published in *Economics of Bargaining*, eds. K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).

Calculus, Cambridge University Press, London (1982).

“Mathematical economics,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications*, 19 (1983), 94–95.

“Bargaining conventions,” *International Journal of Game Theory*, 13 (1984), 193–200.

“Equilibria in extensive games,” *Economic Journal*, 95 (1984), 51–59.

“Bargaining and Coalitions,” in *Game–Theoretic Models of Bargaining*, ed. A. Roth, Cambridge University Press, London (1985).

- “Testing noncooperative game theory: a preliminary study,” *American Economic Review*, 75 (1985), 1178–1180 (with A. Shaked and J. Sutton).
- “Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling,” *RAND Journal of Economics*, 17 (1986), 176–188 (with A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky)
- Economic Organizations as Games*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986) (joint editor with P. Dasgupta).
- Economics of Bargaining*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986) (joint editor with P. Dasgupta).
- “Why game theory ‘doesn’t work’,” in *Analysing Conflict and its Resolution: some mathematical contributions*, ed. P. Bennett, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987)
- “Bargaining models,” in *Proceedings of Norwegian Conference on Natural Gas*, ed. M. Hoel, Cambridge University Press, London (1987).
- “Experimental economics,” *European Economic Review*, 31 (1987), 257–264.
- “Modeling rational players I,” *Economics and Philosophy*, 3 (1987), 179–214.
- “Security equilibrium,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 55 (1988), 33–48 (with Maria Herrero).
- “Matching and bargaining in dynamic markets,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 55 (1988), 17–32 (with Maria Herrero).
- “Modeling rational players II,” *Economics and Philosophy*, 4 (1988), 9–55.
- “Noncooperative bargaining theory: a further test: reply,” *American Economic Review*, 78 (1988), 837–839 (with A. Shaked and J. Sutton).
- “Social contract: Harsanyi and Rawls,” *Economic Journal*, 99 (1989), 84–102.

“An outside option experiment,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 104 (1989), 753–770 (with A. Shaked and J. Sutton).

Essays on the Foundations of Games, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1990)

“Social contract III: utilitarianism and evolution,” *Constitutional Political Economy*, 1 (1990), 1–26.

“Noncooperative models of bargaining” in *The Handbook of Game Theory, Volume I* (1992), 181-200; (edited by R. Aumann and S. Hart; published by North Holland, Amsterdam (with M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein).

“Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 3 (1991), 295-322 (with P. Morgan, A. Shaked and J. Sutton).

“Social contract IV: convention and evolution,” in *Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi*, ed. R. Selten, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (1992).

“Rational choice theory: sufficient but not necessary”, *American Psychologist*, July 1991, 797–799.

“Game theory and the social contract,” in *Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals and Markets*, Reinhard Selten, ed., Springer-Verlag, Berlin (1991)

Fun and Games, D. C. Heath, Lexington Mass., 1991.

“Foundations of game theory”, in *Advances in Economic Theory* J-J Laffont, ed., C. U. P., Cambridge, 1992. (An invited lecture delivered to the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona)

“Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata”, *Journal of Economic Theory* 57 (1992), 278-305 (with L. Samuelson).

“Algorithmic knowledge and game theory”, in *Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction*, C. Bicchieri, ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992)

“DeBayesing game theory”, in *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Game Theory: Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and the*

Philosophy of Science, North Holland, Dordrecht (1993).

“Bargaining and morality: social contract II”, in *Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes from ‘Morals by Agreement’*, R. Sugden, ed., Simon and Schuster, Hemel Hempstead, UK (1993).

Frontiers of Game Theory, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass (1993) (joint editor with A. Kirman and P. Tani).

“Focal points and bargaining”, *International Journal of Game Theory* 22 (1993), 381–409 (with J. Swierzbinski, S. Hsu and C. Proulx).

Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass (1994) (The first volume of a two-volume work)

“An economist’s perspective on the evolution of norms”, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150 (1994), 45-71 (with L. Samuelson).

“Rationality in the centipede”, in the Proceedings of the Fifth TARK Conference on “Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge”, R. Fagin, ed., Morgan Kaufman, San Mateo, California (1994).

“Bargaining theory without tears”, *Investigaciones Economicas* 18 (1994), 403-419.

“Drift”, *European Economic Review* 38 (1994), 851-867 (with Larry Samuelson)

“Games people play”, *Universe Magazine*, 7 (1995), 25.

“Learning to be imperfect: The Ultimatum Game”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 8 (1995), 56-90 (with John Gale and Larry Samuelson).

“Rationalizing backward induction?”, to appear in the Conference Volume of the IEA Conference on Rationality in Economics, Turin 1993 (with Larry Samuelson).

“The game of life”, *Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics* 151 (1995), 132-136.

“Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 11 (1995),

1-35 (with Larry Samuelson and Richard Vaughan).

“Introduction to the Essays of John Nash”, in *Essays on Game Theory* by John Nash, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK (1996).

“Right or seemly?”, *Kritik & Analyse* 18 (1996), 67-80.

“A note on backward induction”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 17 (1996), 135-137.

“Game theory and evolution”, *Demos Quarterly* 10 (1996), 35.

“Imperfect recall”, *Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honour of Reinhard Selten*, edited by W. Albers *et al*, Springer, Berlin (1997).

“Evolution of fairness norms”, *Nordic Journal for Political Economy* 23 (1997), 150-173.

“Rationality and backward induction”, *Journal of Economic Methodology* 4 (1997), 23-41.

“Evolutionary ethics” in *Game Theory, Experience, Rationality: Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics, and Ethics in honor of John C. Harsanyi* 277–283, edited by W. Leinfellner *et al*, Kluwer, Dordrecht (1997).

“Game theory and business ethics”, *Quarterly Journal of Business Ethics* 9 (1999), 31–35.

“Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection”, *Journal of Economic Theory* 74 (1997), 235-266 (with Larry Samuelson).

“Hard bargains and lost opportunities”, *Economic Journal* 108 (1998), 1279-1298 (with C. Proulx, L. Samuelson and J. Swierzbinski).

Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1998).

“The evolution of fairness norms”, *Rationality and Society* 3 (1998), 275-301.

- “Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games played by finite automata”, *Journal of Economic Theory* 80 (1998), 257-291 (with M. Piccione and L. Samuelson).
- “Rationality in multi-agent systems”, *Knowledge Engineering Review* 13 (1998), 309-314.
- “A utilitarian theory of political legitimacy”, in *Economic Values and Organization*, A. Ben-Ner and L. Putterman, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998).
- “Applying game theory to automated negotiation”, *Netnomics* 1 (1998), 1-9 (with N. Vulkan).
- “Gathering wool”, to appear in *Makers of Modern Economics IV* (1998).
- “Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism”, *Utilitas* 10 (1998), 353–367.
- “Why Experiment in Economics?”, *Economic Journal* 109 (1999), F16–F24.
- “Equilibrium Selection and Evolutionary Drift”, *Review of Economic Studies* 66 (1999), 363–394 (with L. Samuelson).
- “Treasury Auctions: Uniform or Discriminatory?”, *Review of Economic Design* 5 (2000), 387–410 (with J. Swierzbinski).
- “Toeholds, Takeovers and Football”, *European Competition Law Review* 21 (2000), 142–144 (with D. Harbord).
- “Natural Justice and Political Stability”, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 157 (2001), 133–151.
- “Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 35 (2001), 6–30 (with L. Samuelson).
- “The Breakdown of Social Contracts”, in *Social Dynamics*, S. Durlauf and P. Young, eds., MIT Press, Cambridge MA (2001).
- “Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study”, *Economic Journal* 111 (2001), 445–

465 (with J. Swierzbinski and C. Proulx).

“Can Mixed Strategies be Stable in Asymmetric Games?”, *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 210 (2001), 1–14 (with L. Samuelson).

“Evolution and Mixed Strategies”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 34 (2001), 200–226 (with L. Samuelson).

“Creativity and Acclaim”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 36 (2001), 9–10 (an appreciation of John Harsanyi).

“How and Why Did Fairness Norms Evolve?” in *The Origin of Human Social Institutions: Proceedings of the British Academy* 110 (2001), 149–170.

“A Backward Induction Experiment”, *Journal of Economic Theory* 104 (2002), 48–88 (with J. McCarthy, L. Samuelson and A. Shaked).

“The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of British 3G Telecom Licences”, *Economic Journal* 112 (2002), C1–C23 (with P. Klemperer).

“Defending Transitivity Against Zeno’s Paradox”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 31 (2003), 272–279 (with A. Voorhoeve). Reprinted in “Recent Work on Intrinsic Value Series”, *Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy* 17 (2005), eds. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen and M. Zimmerman.

“Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 45 (2003), 296–328 (with Larry Samuelson and Peyton Young).

“Natural Justice” in *Fakten statt Normen?* C. Lütge and G. Vollmer eds., Nomos, Bielefeld (2004), 128–152.

“Toeholds, Takeovers, and Football”, *European Competition Law Review* 21 (2004), 1–4 (with David Harbord).

“Reciprocity and the Social Contract”, *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 3 (2004), 5–36.

“Guillermo Owen’s Proof of the Minimax Theorem”. *Theory and Decision* 56 (2004),

19–23.

Natural Justice, Oxford University Press, New York (2005).

“Why the Distinction between Knowledge and Belief May Matter”. *Econ Journal Watch* 2 (2005), 1–12.

Playing for Real, Oxford University Press, New York (2007).

“Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-Based Decision-Making”, *Erkenntnis* 64 (2006), 101–114 (with A. Voorhoeve).

“Evolution of Focal Points”, *Games and Economic Behavior* 55 (2006), 21–42 (with L. Samuelson).

“Economic Man—or Straw Man? A Commentary on Henrich et al”, *Behavioral and Brain Science* 28 (2006), 817–818.

“Bargaining over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates: Countervailing Buyer Power as a Constraint on Monopoly Power”, *Journal of Competition Law and Economics* 1(3) (2005), 449–472 (with D. Harbord).

“Why Do People Cooperate?”, *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 5(1) (2006), 81–96.

Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, (2007).

“Can Knowledge Be Justified True Belief?”, 2006. To appear in a volume honoring John Bell’s sixtieth birthday.

“Justice as a Natural Phenomenon”, 2006. To appear in *Analyse & Kritik*.

“The Origins of Fair Play”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 151 (2007), 151–193.

“Interpersonal Comparison of Utility”, 2007. To appear in the *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economic Science*, edited by Harold Kincaid and Don Ross for Oxford University Press.

- “Game Theory and Ethics”, 2006. To appear in *Handbook of Ethics and Economics*, edited by Jan Peil and Irene van Staveren for Edward Elgar.
- A Very Short Introduction to Game Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007).
- “Cooperation Should not be Assumed”, *Trends in Ecology and Evolution* 21(9) (2006), 476–478 (with J. McNamara and A. Houston).
- “Do Conventions Need To Be Common Knowledge?”, *Topoi* 27 (2008), 17–27.
- “Experimental Economics: What Next?”, 2007. To appear in *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (with A. Shaked).
- “An Experimental Test of Rubinstein’s Bargaining Model”, 2007 (with J. Swierzbinski and C. Tomlinson).
- “Rational Decisions in Large Worlds”, *Annales d’Economie et de Statistique* 86 (2008), 25–41.
- “Naturalizing Harsanyi and Rawls”, in *Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls*, edited by M. Fleurbaey, M. Salles and J. Weymark, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- “Focal Points and Bargaining” in *Handbook of Experimental Economics Results I* edited by Vernon Smith and Charlie Plott. North-Holland, Amsterdam (2008), 500-510 (with Joe Swierzbinski).
- Rational Decisions*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (2009).